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Background. Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)–producing Enterobacteriaceae are emerging world-
wide. Contact isolation is recommended; however, little is known about the rate of transmission without contact
isolation in the non-epidemic setting. Therefore, we aimed to estimate the rate of spread (R0) of ESBL-producing
Enterobacteriaceae in a tertiary care center with 5 intensive care units.
Methods. In this observational cohort study performed from June 1999 through April 2011, all patients at the
University Hospital Basel, Switzerland, who were hospitalized in the same room as a patient colonized or infected
with an ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae for at least 24 hours (index case) were screened for ESBL carriage by
testing of rectal swab samples, swab samples from open wounds or drainages, and urine samples from patients
with foley catheters. Strains with phenotypic evidence for ESBL were conﬁrmed by polymerase chain reaction.
Nosocomial transmission was assumed when the result of screening for ESBL carriage in a contact patient was
positive and molecular typing by pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) revealed clonal relatedness with the
strain from the index patient.
Results. Active screening for ESBL carriage could be performed in 133 consecutive contact patients. Transmission
conﬁrmed by PFGE occurred in 2 (1.5%) of 133 contact patients, after a mean exposure to the index case of 4.3 days.
Conclusions. The estimated rate of spread of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae—in particular, Escherichia coli
—was low in a tertiary care university-afﬁliated hospital with high levels of standard hygiene precautions. The low
level of nosocomial transmission and the rapid emergence of community-acquired ESBL challenge the routine use of
contact isolation in a non-epidemic setting, saving resources and potentially improving patient care.
Multidrug-resistant organisms, including extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)–producing Entero-
bacteriaceae, are rapidly emerging worldwide [1]. This
trend is of particular concern, because gram-negative
bacteria account for a large proportion of health care–
associated infections, especially in intensive care units
[1, 2]. Infections caused by ESBL-producing organisms
have been associated with longer hospital stay,
reduced rates of clinical and microbiological response,
and poor outcome [3, 4]. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has classiﬁed ESBL-
producing pathogens as multidrug-resistant organisms
(MDRO) and has declared the prevention and control
of MDROs to be a national priority [5]. Therefore, the
CDC has published recommendations to guide the im-
plementation of strategies and practices to prevent the
transmission of such organisms in health care settings
[5]. Among recommendations concerning judicious
use of antibiotics, administrative measures, surveil-
lance, and education of health care personnel, contact
precautions are recommended in acute care hospitals
for patients colonized or infected with target MDROs,
as judged by local recommendations to be of
Received 6 May 2012; accepted 24 July 2012; electronically published 5 Sep-
tember 2012.
Correspondence: Andreas F. Widmer, MD, MS, FIDSA, Division of Infectious
Diseases and Hospital Epidemiology, University Hospital Basel, Petersgraben 4,
CH-4031 Basel, Switzerland (Widmera@uhbs.ch).
Clinical Infectious Diseases 2012;55(11):1505–11
© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious
Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail:
journals.permissions@oup.com.
DOI: 10.1093/cid/cis770
Transmission of ESBL-Producers • CID 2012:55 (1 December) • 1505
epidemiologic signiﬁcance [5, 6]. In Switzerland, national
guidelines recommend contact precautions for all patients col-
onized or infected with ESBL-producing organisms in acute
care facilities [7]. At the University Hospital Basel, Switzer-
land, therefore, all patients with detection of ESBL-producing
pathogens are assigned to contact precautions, including the
universal use of gowns and gloves and placement in single
rooms. Active surveillance by screening for ESBL carriage is
performed for all patients who were hospitalized in the same
room for >24 hours with a patient colonized or infected with
an ESBL-producing pathogen before the positive ESBL result
was reported and the patient was assigned to contact precau-
tions. The CDC recommendation is not based on large clinical
trials evaluating the effect of contact isolation compared with
non-contact isolation. However, knowledge on the rate of
spread is essential to guide future recommendations on
contact precautions to reduce transmission of ESBL-producing
Enterobacteriaceae.
The aim of this study was therefore to estimate the rate of spread
(R0) for ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae in a tertiary care
center with 5 intensive care units over an 11-year study period.
METHODS
Setting
The University Hospital Basel is a tertiary care center with 5
intensive care units in Basel, Switzerland, with 855 beds, that
admits >30 000 adult patients per year. The study was
approved by the local ethics committee as part of the quality
assurance program, and informed consent was waved.
Study Design
This is an observational cohort study.
Data Collection
Data were collected from June 1999 through April 2011. The
following baseline characteristics and clinical features of index
and contact patients were assessed: age, sex, length of hospital
stay (days), length of ICU stay (hours), the number of under-
lying diseases, the number of previous hospital stays (before
detection of an ESBL-producing pathogen for index patients
and before screening for ESBL-carriage for contact patients),
leukocyte count, C-reactive protein and albumin levels on the
day of detection of an ESBL-producing pathogen for index pa-
tients and on the day of screening for ESBL-carriage for
contact patients (± 7 days), and outcome (deﬁned as discharge
home, transfer to another hospital, or death).
Deﬁnition of Index Patients
All patients colonized or infected with an ESBL-producing
pathogen in any specimen from each body site were assigned
to contact precautions exclusively in single rooms. Patients
from whom an ESBL-producing pathogen was isolated were
marked in our electronic chart. An e-mail alarm was set for
infection control staff, after the patient was scheduled for an
in- or outpatient visit or when admitted as emergency. In ad-
dition, the requirement of contact isolation was listed on the
top page of the administrative and medical charts.
Contact precautions were discontinued when a patient had
3 negative results, deﬁned as no ESBL detection from each of
the following body sites: the site in which ESBL-producing
pathogens were ﬁrst detected, the rectum, urine, and any open
wounds or drainages [8].
Deﬁnition of Contact Patients
All patients hospitalized in the same room as an index patient
colonized or infected with ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
for at least 24 hours were deﬁned as contact patients.
Contact Time
Contact time of an index patient with a contact patient was
deﬁned as the period that the 2 shared the same room together
without initiation of contact precautions for the index patient
before colonization or infection with an ESBL-producing path-
ogen was identiﬁed by the microbiology laboratory.
Deﬁnition of Transmission
Transmission was regarded to have occurred when the result
of screening for ESBL carriage of a contact patient was positive
and the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) subtype and molec-
ular typing by pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) revealed
identity with the strain of the index patient.
Active Surveillance for ESBL Carriage
Screening for ESBL carriage was performed by testing of rectal
swab samples and swab samples from any open wounds or
drainages and culture of urine samples from patients with
foley catheters. Active surveillance was performed for all
contact patients, as deﬁned above, as long as they were still
hospitalized and were not receiving antibiotic treatment active
against ESBL-producing pathogens, as determined by the sus-
ceptibility testing of the isolate of the respective index patient,
to avoid false screening results.
In addition, all patients with known ESBL carriage were
screened when they were readmitted to the hospital.
Standard Precautions
Standard precautions include the proper use of hand hygiene
(as indicated in the World Health Organization and CDC
guidelines) [6, 9] and the use of personal protective equipment
(ie, gloves, gowns, masks, and eye protection) for procedures
involving contact with body ﬂuids, as outlined by the CDC
guidelines [6].
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Contact Precautions
Contact precautions involved assignment to a single room and
use of gloves and gowns by both health care workers and visi-
tors at entrance [6].
ESBL Identiﬁcation
For microbiological detection of ESBL, standard culture
methods were performed in accordance with the guidelines of
the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (formerly Na-
tional Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards) [10].
Routine susceptibility testing was performed using microbroth
dilution (Micronaut-S, Merlin) with use of the following com-
pounds for ESBL screening: cefpodoxime, ceftriaxone, ceftazi-
dime, and aztreonam. If the screening test yielded any positive
result, conﬁrmation testing was performed using Etest strips
(AB Biodisk[now, bioMérieux]) containing cefotaxime or cef-
tazidime, each tested with and without clavulanic acid.
Genotypic Identiﬁcation of ESBL
Total DNA was extracted from approximately 3 × 107 colony-
forming units of bacterial cells with use of 200 mL InstaGene
Matrix (BioRad), according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
The complete open reading frame of genes encoding sulfhydryl
variable (SHV) β-lactamases was ampliﬁed with the primer
pairs SHV-UF (5′-GCCGGGTTATTCTTATTTGT CGC-3′)
and SHV-LR1 (5′-TCACCACCATCATTACCGAC-3′). For de-
tection of blaCTX-M and identiﬁcation of CTX-M-cluster, 2
different methods were applied [11]. In the ﬁrst assay, a 512-bp
internal fragment ranging from position 213 to position 724
(blaCTX−M−1) was ampliﬁed using the degenerative oligonucleo-
tides CTX-F2 (5′-GTGCAGYACCAGTAARGTKATGG-3′)
and CTX-M-R1 (5′-CDMCGCT GCCGGTYTTATC-3′). The
CTX-M–positive isolates obtained during 2006 and 2007 were
subjected to a multiplex PCR, as described elsewhere [12]. Se-
quencing of amplicons was performed using an ABI 3130
Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystems).
Molecular Typing
Molecular typing was performed using PFGE [13], to examine
the identity of the strains. DNA restriction fragments were
separated by PFGE after XbaI digestion and dendrograms
were drawn with use of the software GelCompar, version 4.5
(Applied Maths).
Statistical Analyses
Data were entered into a database (Excel; Microsoft) and then
imported into SPSS (version 120.0; SPSS). Univariate analysis
was performed using the χ2 test or Fisher’s exact test, where
appropriate, for categorical variables and 2-tailed Student’s
t test for continuous variables.
RESULTS
From June 1999 through April 2011, 324 patients infected or
colonized with ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae accounted
for 551 hospital admissions. A total of 93 (28.7%) of 324 were
index patients and had a total of 220 contact patients. The
median number of contacts for each index patient was 1.0
(range, 1–7 contacts). Active screening for ESBL carriage
could be performed in 133 (60%) of 220 consecutive contact
patients. Screening could not be performed for the remaining
87 contact patients, either because they were already dis-
charged from the hospital at the time that the result was ob-
tained for their respective index patient or because they were
receiving antibiotic treatment active against the ESBL-
producing pathogen for which screening was intended.
There were no signiﬁcant differences in age and sex
between index and contact patients (Table 1). However, length
of hospital stay, number of previous hospital stays, the
number of underlying diseases, and mean albumin level at ad-
mission differed signiﬁcantly between the 2 groups (Table 1).
Escherichia coli was the most common ESBL-producing path-
ogen detected in index patients (68 [73.1%] of 93), followed by
Klebsiella pneumoniae (22 [23.7%] of 93) and Klebsiella oxytoca,
Citrobacter freundii, and Enterobacter aerogenes (1 case each).
Sixty (65%) of 93 ESBL isolates were molecularly characterized.
The CTX-M genotype was most commonly identiﬁed (47
[50.5%]), followed by SHV (9 [9.7%]) and others (4 [4.3%]).
A total of 579 contact days was recorded during the study
period, with a mean of 4.3 ±4.89 days and a median of 3 days
(range, 1–37 days). Screening results revealed carriage of
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae in 7 (5.3%) of the 133
examined contact patients. In 6 and 1 contact patients, ESBL-
producing E. coli and K. pneumoniae, respectively, were de-
tected, representing the same species from both index and
contact patient. Although in 6 of these 7 pairs of index and
contact patients, the same molecular ESBL type was found
(Table 2), PFGE only revealed identity of the strains in 2
(30%) of 7 contact patients (Figures 1 and 2). Therefore,
transmission as demonstrated by PFGE had been deﬁnitely
conﬁrmed in only 2 (1.5%) of 133 contact patients.
The ﬁrst transmission occurred on a surgical ward in a
2-bed room after 10 days of contact with the index patient.
The 2 patients staying in the same room shared the same
bathroom. ESBL-producing E. coli was detected by rectal swab
of the contact patient and was interpreted as colonization,
because no clinical signs of infection could be detected. The
second transmission occurred in a general medical ward, also
in a 2-bed room, after 9 days of contact; the 2 patients again
shared the same bathroom. ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae
was detected by rectal swab and was regarded as colonization.
Therefore, exposure to an ESBL-positive index patient did not
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Table 1. Baseline Characteristics of Index Patients Colonized or Infected With Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase–Producing Patho-
gens and Contact Patients
Characteristic Index Patients (n = 93) Contact Patients (n = 133) P OR 95% CI
Age (years)
Mean (± SD) 67.05 (±17.35) 70.43 (±17.37) .152
Sex
Male 42 45.2% 64 48.1% .661 0.888 .522–1.511
Female 51 54.8% 69 51.9%
Length of hospital stay (days)
Mean (± SD) 29.55 (±25.51) 21.25 (±20.84) .008
Median (range) 22.00 (2–127) 14 (2–130)
Length of ICU stay (hours)
Mean (± SD) 13.09 (±77.64) 28.8 (±124.24) .284
Number of underlying diseases
Mean (± SD) 10.08 (± 4.95) 7.35 (±4.58) <.001
Number of previous hospital stays
Mean (± SD) 5.37 (±6.06) 3.11 (± 5.85) .005
Leukocytes (× 109/L)
Mean (± SD) 9.12 (±3.96) 10.22 (±5.12) .089
CRP (mg/L)
Mean (± SD) 57.36 (±76.34) 53.64 85.28 .741
Albumin (g/l)
mean (± SD) 27.72 (±8.01) 32.51 (±77.1) <.001
Number of contacts
Mean (± SD) 1.43 (±0.89)
Number of contact days
Mean (± SD) 4.35 (±4.89)
Median (range) 3 (1–37)
Outcome
Transferal to another hospital 24 25.8% 55 41.4% .016 0.493 .277–.880
Discharge 61 65.6% 72 54.1% .085 1.615 .934–2.791
Death 8 8.6% 6 4.5% .209 1.992 .667–5.946
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; CRP, C-reactive protein; ICU, intensive care unit; OR, odds ratio; SD, standard deviation.
Table 2. Laboratory Findings and Exposure Days for All Index-Contact Pairs With Possible Transmission (Proven Transmission High-
lighted in Grey)
Pair Index Contact Match PFGE Exposure days
1 Species E. coli E.coli 11% 9
PCR other than CTX-M other than CTX-M
2 Species
PCR
E. coli
CTX-M
E. coli
CTX-M
92.6% 10
3 Species E. coli E. coli 23.7% 3
PCR CTX-M CTX-M
4 Species E. coli E. coli 11.0% 13
PCR CTX-M CTX-M
5 Species E. coli E. coli 11.0% 6
PCR CTX-M other than CTX-M
6 Species
PCR
K. pneumoniae
CTX-M
K. pneumoniae
CTX-M
95.7% 9
7 Species E. coli E. coli 18.5% 3
PCR CTX-M CTX-M
Abbreviatons: PCR, polymerase chain reaction; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
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lead to a single infection during a >10-year period, involving
>300 000 inpatients at our University Hospital.
Epidemiological surveillance and molecular typing did not
provide any evidence for a common source or outbreak during
the study period.
DISCUSSION
During an 11-year and 10-month study period, 133 contact
patients, accounting for 579 contact days, were identiﬁed.
With use of standard precautions, 2 transmissions of ESBL-
producing Enterobacteriaceae were identiﬁed, both resulting in
colonization, but not infection, of the contact patient. Our
results therefore suggest that standard precautions may be
sufﬁcient and contact isolation may not be required for ESBL-
producing E. coli–colonized or infected patients, even in inten-
sive care units. These results provide evidence that the low
rate of transmission does not justify the additional resources
for contact isolation. ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae are
emerging in all parts of the world and are common in Europe.
Figure 1. Pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis for index-contact pairs 1–5 and 7 with detection of Escherichia coli. The strains in the lanes not labelled
were detected in patients not included in our study (ie, strains sent to the microbiology laboratory from other institutions or strains from patients at our
institutions who had no contacts or were only seen as outpatients). Abbreviation: PFGE, pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis.
Figure 2. Pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis for index-contact pair 6 with detection of Klebsiella pneumoniae. Abbreviation: PFGE, pulsed-ﬁeld gel
electrophoresis.
Transmission of ESBL-Producers • CID 2012:55 (1 December) • 1509
The dissemination of high-risk strains, such as the global
ST131 E. coli clone often harbouring CTX-M-15 ESBLs,
which has been isolated from non-human sources, including
farm and companion animals, river water, and foods [14], and
widespread use of antibiotics in both humans and animals
may be the more important drivers for the spread of these
drug-resistant pathogens [15], compared with nosocomial
transmission. The low level of transmission detected in this
study challenges the current policy of contact isolation, rapidly
exceeding the capacity of isolation rooms in many hospitals.
Therefore, the policy of applying standard precautions for
ESBL-producing E. coli appears to be a reasonable step to
balance risk of transmission and allocation of resources.
Several issues should be considered before moving to stan-
dard precautions. Our results are applicable to the sporadic
setting or a setting of endemicity and may not be useful
during an outbreak or epidemic. Because most ESBL-produc-
ing gram-negative pathogens were E. coli, these results cannot
be extrapolated to non–E. coli strains. The small sample size
of the latter group does not allow for meaningful conclusions.
A distinction between E. coli and non–E. coli ESBLs is also
supported by the fact that >90% of chicken meat [16, 17] and
almost 20% of Swiss pork may be contaminated with E. coli
ESBLs [18]. The predominant ESBL genotype in chicken meat
and pork was CTX-M. Therefore, increasing evidence suggests
that spread of ESBL-producing E. coli relates more to the food
chain than to nosocomial transmission in health care settings.
Furthermore, we cannot exclude that the low rate of trans-
mission at our institution may be attributable to a high level of
infection control standards, with continuing education and sur-
veillance of hand hygiene being a major focus [19]. Socioeco-
nomic status, most probably reﬂecting poor hygiene, has been
revealed as an independent risk factor for ESBL carriage [20].
The nosocomial transmission rate of highly drug-resistant
gram-negative bacteria was also found to be relatively low in a
large multi-center trial involving 18 Dutch hospitals that,
however, did not involve active screening procedures of
contact patients [21]. The adjusted transmission index, the
ratio of secondary to primary cases, in the participating hospi-
tals ranged from 0.0 to 0.2. The authors also concluded that
well-established transmission-based precautions were used in
all enrolled hospitals.
Contact isolation has been well established for control of
transmission of multidrug-resistant gram-positive organisms,
such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
and vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) [22, 23]. These
pathogens survive for days and weeks on surfaces, whereas En-
terobactericeae do not survive for prolonged periods on dry
surfaces [24]. In addition, psoriasin on the human skin can
kill E. coli, but carriage of S. aureus is observed in more than
one-third of the population [25]. Both transmissions, which
occurred in our study, may have been attributable to patients
sharing the same bathroom, with humidity facilitating survival
of gram-negatives bacteria on surfaces that are generally not
viable after drying [26].
Secondary end points of the study were length of hospital
stay, number of underlying diseases, number of previous hos-
pital stays, and mean albumin level at admission, which dif-
fered signiﬁcantly between patients infected or colonized with
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae and contact patients, a
ﬁnding previously reported in the literature [27, 28]. Schoe-
vaerdts et al reported a high prevalence of major comorbidi-
ties in a descriptive analysis of 114 consecutive patients with
recovery of ESBL-positive Enterobacteriaceae [28]. The signiﬁ-
cantly lower mean albumin level detected in our study for
index patients, compared with contacts, possibly reﬂects
poorer health conditions of patients colonized or infected with
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae. Because length of hospi-
tal stay and number of previous hospital stays were greater in
this study for index patients, one could hypothesize that there
is a role of nosocomial transmission in acquiring ESBL-
producing Enterobacteriaceae. However, our data collected
over an 11-year study period do not support this assumption.
Increased exposure to antibiotics because of the comorbid
state (resulting in selection pressure in colonized patients), re-
ﬂected by longer and numerous hospitalizations, could explain
these ﬁndings. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain in-
formation on prior antibiotic exposure to support this as-
sumption in our study.
Important limitations of our study are its observational
design and that it was conducted at a single center. However,
randomized controlled clinical trials over several years are
rarely sponsored and are difﬁcult to perform. Only one clinical
trial (NCT00976638) is listed in the National Institutes of
Health–sponsored database on transmission of multidrug-
resistant pathogens, including ESBL in intensive care units,
also an observational clinical trial. The true extent of transmis-
sion may have been underestimated, because the ESBL-
encoding genes are mostly located on mobile genetic elements,
such as plasmids and could therefore have been transferred to
other Enterobacteriaceae. However, because of the small
number of positive screening results of contact patients, we do
not believe that this limitation questions the ﬁndings and con-
clusions of our study. Moreover, the detection method could
have missed some ESBL strains in contact patients. However,
we used standard selective culture methods, and chromogenic
agar plates selectively for ESBL screening were not available at
the beginning of the study. Because the vast majority of ESBL
producers at our institution are E. coli, our results may not be
generalizable to other Enterobacteriaceae. Furthermore, only
hospitalized patients were included; therefore, results may not
be extrapolated to an outpatient setting or to healthy
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individuals. However, the burden of contact isolation is
mainly an issue in hospitals rather than in the outpatient
setting. Finally, our results are applicable to acute care with
short-term hospitalization (≤5 days) and to institutions with a
high standard of standard precautions (especially hand
hygiene) and low numbers of beds per room (1–2 beds per
room). The rate of transmission may be different in prolonged
hospitalization and requires another study design.
We conclude that the rate of transmission of ESBL-
producing Enterobacteriaceae—in particular, E. coli—is very
low in our large tertiary care center, challenging the current
concept of routine contact isolation of patients infected with
ESBL-producing E. coli, the most common pathogen harbour-
ing ESBL. Omitting contact isolation in these cases could save
resources and potentially improve patient care and comfort.
This approach is also supported by the fact that ESBL-producing
E. coli has been found in many food items [16, 17, 18].
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